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Abstract
Corporate governance has become a globally debated topic.
1  As multinational
corporations enter new global markets, complications abound due to the myriad of corporate
governance rules existing among the various legal systems.
2  One example of the new
markets becoming more available to American investment is the Chinese market.  In light of
both the grant of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China
3 and China’s anticipated
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
4 the American business community is
apt to find more opportunity for investment in China.
5
American investors are likely to be increasingly interested in understanding the current
Chinese corporate governance regime as they consider the Chinese market for investment of
their assets.  The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of the corporate governance
system in China and offer some suggestions for improvement to make the Chinese market
more attractive to foreign investors.
This paper is organized as follows.  Part I provides general background information on
the historical corporate governance structures prevalent in China.  Part II then analyzes
current governance issues, in particular those occurring in the context of corporatization of
China’s State-owned enterprises.  Part III offers proposals for reform and is followed in Part
IV by our concluding remarks.
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I. A Historical Perspective - The State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)
Traditionally, the production of goods and services in China has been conducted by state
owned enterprises (SOEs).  The SOE has evolved in China from a model where the State held
all property ownership and managerial rights, to a contracting model where the enterprise
became responsible for its own profits and losses, to a model that resembles a corporation in
the United States.  These SOE governance models can be classified as follows:  (1) the
traditional model (1950s to 1984); (2) the transitional model (1984 to 1993); and (3) the
modern corporate model (1993 to present).  An understanding of the history of the SOE
governance model is essential to identifying proposals for modern corporate governance
requirements for corporatization of SOEs.  Salient features of the traditional and transitional
models are described below.  The modern corporate model is the topic of Part II.
 A.  Traditional model (1950s to 1984)
The traditional model of SOE governance could also be referred to as the State-ownership
model, or the State-owned and managed model.  This model was dominant from the 1950s
through 1984.  Under this model, State ownership was generally assumed to be the only legal
form available to provide safeguard for State property.  Not only did the State have ownership
of all the property of the SOEs, but it also enjoyed managerial powers.  The backbone
rationale behind this model was paramount State property ownership.
6
Unfortunately, the concept of State ownership not only depressed the growth of private
sector in China,
7 but also deprived SOEs of economic and legal independence.
8  This
concept, developed in a planned economy,
9 provided justification for State planners to
mobilize human and financial resources and to decide production and distribution demands.
The duties of SOE executives were to fulfill the production plans of the government, rather
than enhance profits for the State investor.  In other words, SOEs were not real business
enterprises.  The terms “corporation ” or “legal person” did not exist in China during theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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central-planning period.  Most SOEs were simply referred to as “factories”(Gongchang), and
merely functioned as government affiliates responsible for producing goods or rendering
services.
10
Accordingly, the governance structure in SOEs was an integral part of the general
governmental framework.  The executives of SOEs were appointed and dismissed by
government agencies, and enjoyed the same political and economic treatment of government
officials (so called “State cadres” -- Guojia Ganbu).
11  The executives were responsible to
government agencies.  Their achievements were not evaluated by the enterprises' financial
performance, but by the enterprises' performance in satisfying the plans made by government
agencies.
The traditional model not only served as an organizer of economic resources and
activities, but also as a tool to firmly bind the State, SOEs and employees.  State coffers were
the sole source of SOEs input; SOEs and their employees effectively lived off of the SOE
coffers.  SOEs were thus both production units and social security units.  Once a person
entered an SOE, he or she gained a “iron rice bowl ” which could be kept for life in terms of
salary, housing, medical treatment, and pension.  SOE as a State-owned Working Unit
(gongzuo danwei) had a rich and unusual meaning for Chinese employees, and could not be
easily understood by their counterparts in the U.S.
12  Unfortunately, most SOEs were static
and uncompetitive.
B.  Transitional model (1984 to 1993)
The transitional model of SOE governance is also referred to as the State-creditor’s rights
model, or the contracting model.  This model was dominant from approximately 1984
through 1993, until the Corporate Law was enacted.  As a strategy to encourage SOEs to
expand production and to earn profits, SOE reform had been the main part of Chinese
economic reforms since late 1970s.
13  The goal of the reform initiatives was to make SOEsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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responsible for their own gains and losses in the market.  In the official language, “SOEs
should become legal persons that enjoy full management authority and full responsibility for
their own profits and losses.”
14  One of the leading theories advocated by this reform
initiative was “separation between the State ownership and the SOE management rights.”
15
Policy-makers at the time believed that this was the best way to transform SOEs into legal
entities, while simultaneously retaining State property ownership.  To accomplish the reform
objectives, the SOEs Law was adopted in 1988 (SOEs Law).
The SOEs Law of 1988 recognized that:
 The property of the enterprise shall be owned by the whole people (equivalent to the
notation of “State”), and shall be operated and managed by the enterprise with the
authorization of the State based on the principle of the separation of ownership and right
of management.  The enterprise shall enjoy the rights to possess, use, and dispose of,
according to law,
16 the property, which the state has authorized it to operate and manage.
The enterprise shall obtain the status of legal person in accordance with law and bear civil
liability with the property, which the State has authorized it to operate and manage.  The
enterprise may, in accordance with the decision of competent government agencies, adopt
contracting, leasing or other forms of [a] managerial responsibility system.
17
The corporate governance structure introduced by the SOEs Law of 1988 has three salient
features.  First, the factory director (manager) assumes overall responsibility for the
enterprise management.
18  This means that the factory director acts as the legal representative
of the enterprise, and exercises leadership in the production, operation and management of
the enterprise.  In other words "the factory director occupies the central position in the
enterprise."
19  The law also imposed a requirement of establishing a management committee
or another consulting body to be chaired by the factory director, to assist the factory director
in making decisions on important issues.
20
Second, the SOEs Law provides that the local organization of the Chinese Communist
Party in the enterprise guarantees and supervises the implementation of the guiding principles
and policies of the Party and the State in the enterprise.
21  Third, the enterprise is allowed,
through the employees' congress and other forms, to practice democratic management,
22 tradeWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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unions are permitted to represent and safeguard the employees' interests and employees may
organize and participate in democratic management and supervision.
23
Between 1987 and 1993, the contracting system (Cheng Bao Zhi), was adopted in many
SOEs to govern their relationship with the State and factory director.  In April, 1987, the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council adopted a
contracting system in SOEs nationwide.
24  According to contracting system, the two parties
to the contract are the government agency and the SOE as represented by its chief executive
officer (CEO).
25  The CEOs of SOEs are selected through a competitive process.
26  The CEOs
act as the legal representatives of SOEs, and take full responsibility for managing their
SOEs.
27  The basic principle of contracting system was to "lock the minimum amount of
profit for the SOEs to pay to the State," and entitle SOEs "to keep the remaining profit, but
[remain] liable for paying the fixed amount to the State even if [the] SOEs have not made
satisfactory profit."
28
As a result of the contracting process, governmental intervention in the operation of SOEs
was significantly diminished, and SOEs gained more freedom to make their own business
decisions.  The SOEs were allowed to retain part of their profits after completing the
government's assignments.  As an economist commented, with the help of the contracting
system, "the State fiscal revenue was reasonably increased.  The loss-making SOEs only
accounted for 10% among all the SOEs.  There was no enterprise having difficulties in
paying their employees, and there was no enterprise going bankrupt or laying off their
employees."
29
But the contracting system and the transitional model it represented failed to provide much
in the way of SOE reform for a number of reasons.  First, it was very difficult to identify a
reasonable minimum amount of profit for the SOEs to pay to the State.
30  Second, although
most SOEs enjoyed benefits when they were profitable, they were unable to pay the fixedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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amounts required to the State when they sustained losses.
31  Third, there was a fair amount of
exploitation of the assets of SOEs for personal use.
32  Finally, too little SOE profit was
retained for development purposes, leaving insufficient resources for future expansion.
33
With these problems in mind, SOE reform in 1993 reflected a desire to building a modern
enterprise system compatible with market economy.
34  To achieve this goal, Chinese policy
makers began to look to the modern corporation model in the Western world for possible
solutions.
II. Modern Corporate Model (1993 - Present)
After the late paramount leader, Mr. Deng Xiaoping called for an introduction of the
market economy in China in 1992, one of the goals of SOE reform was officially identified as
to "set up [a] modern enterprise system (modern corporation system)
35 in the majority of
backbone large and medium-sized SOEs."
36  SOE reform policy also accelerated the process
of corporate legislation, which was perceived as an essential legal instrument for
corporatizing SOEs.
37
China is in the process of restructuring many traditional SOEs.  The corporations
restructured from traditional SOEs in China are referred to as SOE-corporatized corporations.
Compared with traditional SOEs, the ownership structure of SOE-corporatized corporations
include more well-defined shareholder rights than its traditional counterpart, and promotes
more efficiency and accountability.  In comparison with corporations held by individuals or
private institutions, SOE-corporatized corporations are expected to present more
sophisticated and difficult governance issues during the current transition period from the
planned economy to the market economy in China.
The Corporate Law of 1993 provides solid legal foundations for transformation of SOEs
into different business corporations, including wholly State-owned corporations, closely held
corporations and publicly held corporations.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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A.  The Corporate Law
In China today, the most important legal sources of corporate governance rules are the
laws passed by the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC)
38 and its Standing Committee.
39  These
laws include the Corporate Law of 1993 (Corporate Law),
40 and the Securities Law of 1998
(Securities Law).
41  In addition to legal sources, the memorandum of associations (Gongsi
Zhangcheng)
42 of each corporation plays an active role in designing each corporation’s
corporate governance structure.  The Chinese memorandum of associations is comparable to
a document that would combine both the articles of incorporation and bylaws of American
corporations.
43
The Corporate Law (Law) requires corporations to form three statutory and
indispensable corporate governing bodies:  (1) the shareholders, acting as a body at the
general meeting; (2) the board of directors; and (3) the board of supervisors.
44  In addition,
the Law introduced two statutory corporate positions - the chair of board of directors (chair)
and the chief executive officer.
45
    At first glance, the Chinese corporate governance structure may appear similar to the
two-tier system of corporate governance in Germany.  The German corporation is also
governed by a board of directors and a supervisory board.
46  However, there are substantial
differences between the German and Chinese systems.  For instance, there is no hierarchical
relation between the board of directors and the board of supervisors in China, and both
directors and supervisors are appointed by, and may be dismissed by, action of the
shareholders.
47  In contrast, the German supervisory board oversees the board of directors,
and the members of the board of directors are appointed by, and may be dismissed by, the
board of supervisors.
48
Chinese corporate law recognizes only two types of corporations:  closely held
corporations (Youxian Zeren Gongsi) and publicly held corporations (Gufen YouxianWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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Gongsi).
49  Within each category of corporation, there are special provisions applicable to
subcategories, organized according to the corporation’s ownership structure.  The governing
bodies in closely and publicly held corporations are substantially the same.
50
1.  Closely Held Corporations
Although governance rules for closely held corporations are similar to those of publicly
held corporations, Chapter 2 of the Corporate Law contains a number of special provisions
applicable only to closely held corporations.  For example, a corporation with "few
shareholders" and “small capital size” is not required to set up a board of directors, instead it
is required only to have a single executive director and the executive director may serve
concurrently as the manager.  In addition, this type of corporation does not need an entire
board of supervisors, one or two supervisors will suffice.
51  Although in general the voting
rights of shareholders in closely held corporations are exercised in proportion to their capital
contributions,
52 in the situation where a shareholder wishes to assign its capital contribution
to non-shareholders, the consent of greater than 50% of the total number of shareholders is
required.
53
The Corporate Law has different rules for closely held corporations wholly-owned by the
State as opposed to those that include a foreign investor.  These rules are discussed below.
a.  Wholly State-owned corporations
A wholly State-owned corporation is defined as “a limited liability corporation invested
and established solely by the State-authorized investment institutions or government
agencies."
54  Under the Corporate Law as originally enacted, there were only two corporate
bodies statutorily required in wholly State-owned corporations:  the board of directors and the
CEO.  Because there are no general meetings of shareholders and no board of supervisors in
state-owned corporations, the board of directors and the CEO have more governing powers
than their counterparts in other types of corporations.  State-authorized investmentWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
8
institutions or government agencies have the power to make decisions on important corporate
issues.
55  Certain types of transactions, such as corporate mergers, divisions, dissolutions,
increases and reductions of capital, and issuance of corporate bonds, may only be decided by
the State-authorized investment institutions or government agencies.
56
With generous powers in the hands of insiders of wholly State-owned corporations, many
senior executives in SOEs prefer to transform their SOEs into wholly State-owned
corporations.
57  Unfortunately, though, the generous powers provided to the management of
wholly State-owned corporations have led to management irresponsibility in recent years.
58
In order to strengthen the supervisory mechanism in wholly State-owned corporations (and
therefore, to address the problem of corruption), the Standing Committee of the NPC
amended the Corporate Law on December 25 of 1999 to require wholly State-owned
corporations to establish boards of supervisors, whose members shall be chosen by the State
Council, or by the State-authorized investment institutions, or by government agencies.
59
Under this amendment, the number of supervisors shall be no fewer than three, and the board
of supervisors should include at least one employee representative.
60  In addition to the power
to examine corporate financial affairs and to supervise directors and executives, the board of
supervisors also enjoys other powers delegated by the State Council.
61
b.  Foreign invested corporations
Another special provision applicable to closely held corporations concerns those that are
foreign invested.  In China, there are three types of foreign invested corporations:  (1) wholly
foreign-invested enterprises; (2) Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures; and (3) Chinese-
foreign contractual joint ventures.  These types of foreign invested corporations are governed
by three separate laws:  the Wholly Foreign-Invested Enterprises Law of 1986,
62 the Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law of 1979,
63 and the Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint
Ventures Law of 1988,
64 respectfully.  These three statutes were enacted before the enactmentWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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of the Corporate Law, thus the relationship between the foreign investment legislation and the
Corporate Law is left unclear.  The Corporate Law attempts to address this issue by providing
that the Corporate Law "shall apply to limited liability corporations with foreign investment;
where legislation on Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual joint
ventures and wholly foreign-invested enterprises provide otherwise, such provisions shall
prevail."
65
It is expected that China will join the WTO in the near future, and thus will become
obligated to provide national treatment to foreign investors coming from other WTO
members.  Once this occurs, it is also expected that the statutes regulating foreign
investments will be repealed, and Chinese-invested corporations and foreign-invested
corporations will be governed by the same corporate governance norms.
1.  Wholly foreign-invested enterprises
Wholly foreign-invested enterprises may take different legal forms, such as a
corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship.  The Wholly Foreign-Invested Enterprises
Law
66 is generally silent on corporate governance structure.  The corporate governance
structure of these entities is therefore governed by the law applicable to their specific form of
entity.
2.  Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures
Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures must be organized as closely held corporations,
67
but neither a general meeting of shareholders nor a board of supervisors is required.  The
composition of the board of directors is to be stipulated in the contract and the memorandum
of associations after negotiation among the shareholders.  The Chair and the Vice-Chair shall
be chosen through consultation by the parties to the venture, or elected by the board of
directors.  If the Chinese party or the foreign party takes the office of the Chair, the other
party shall assume the office of the vice-Chair.  The CEO and associate CEO shall be chosenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
10
from the various shareholders.
68
3.  Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures
Both equity joint ventures and contractual joint ventures are invested by foreign
corporations, enterprises, economic entities and individuals in collaboration with Chinese
corporations, enterprises and economic entities.  There are, however, a number of differences
between equity joint ventures and contractual joint ventures.  First, equity joint ventures must
take the form of closely held corporations.
69  This organizational form is not required for
contractual joint ventures.  Only contractual joint ventures may acquire the status of a
Chinese legal person in accordance with law.
70  Second, the investors of equity joint ventures
share dividends and undertake risks and losses in accordance with the percentage of
shareholding in the registered capital,
71 whereas the investors of contractual joint ventures
share dividends or products and undertake risks and losses in accordance with the agreements
prescribed in the contractual joint venture contract.
72  Third, the investors of equity joint
ventures usually receive monetary dividends,
73 while the investors of contractual joint
ventures could receive either monetary dividends or products as the form of investment
return.  Fourth, foreign investors of contractual joint ventures may seek return of their capital
contribution before the company is wound up, if all of the fixed assets of the contractual joint
venture belong to the Chinese party, and if agreed to by both the Chinese and the foreign
parties.
74  In most other respects, contractual joint ventures organized as closely held
corporations are governed in a similar manner as equity joint ventures.
75
2.  Publicly Held Corporations
A publicly held corporation is also called a joint stock limited company (Gufen
Youxian Gongsi).  The Corporate Law defines a publicly held corporation as a corporation in
which the "total capital shall be divided into equal shares, shareholders shall assume liability
towards the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings, and the corporation shallWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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be liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets.
76  Publicly held corporations can be
categorized into listed corporations, and non-listed corporations.  A listed corporation refers
to "a joint stock limited corporation which has its issued shares listed and traded at stock
exchanges with the approval of the State Council or the department of securities
administration authorized by the State Council."
77 The shares of a non-listed corporation are
not listed on a stock exchange.  Publicly held corporations are governed by both the
Corporate Law
78 and the Securities Law.
79
B.  Modern SOEs
The modern SOE is governed today both by the SOEs Law of 1988 and the Corporate
Law of 1993.  The SOEs Law requires modern SOEs  to:  (1) clearly establish ownership; (2)
provide well-defined rights and responsibilities; (3) separate the enterprise from government;
and (4) employ principles of scientific management.
80
Pursuant to the requirement of clearly established ownership, shareholders of  modern
SOEs are entitled to enjoy their shareholders’ rights in proportion to their shares, and are
obligated to transfer the ownership of their investment to the corporation.
81  Further,
corporations enjoy full ownership over the capital contributed by shareholders, as well as
ownership of the profits and properties subsequently acquired by the corporation.
Shareholders are also entitled to dividends after the dividends are declared, and to net assets
when the corporation is liquidated.  Finally, the shareholder’s personal property, including
their capital investment, is separate and independent from the corporation’s property.
The phrase “well-defined rights and responsibilities" refers to a clear and certain
delineation of rights, obligations and liabilities between and among the corporation,
shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers and other stakeholders.  Eight legal
relationships are specifically enumerated.  These are:  (1) the relationship between the
corporation and its shareholders including a corporate parent; (2) shareholder relationshipsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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among themselves: (3) the fiduciary relationship between a corporation and its directors,
supervisors and top management; (4) the relationship between a corporation and its creditors;
(5) the relationship between shareholders and creditors; (6) the legal relationship between a
corporation and its employees; (7) the relationship between a corporation and its competitors;
and (8) the relationship the corporation has with its consumers.
The SOEs Law also promotes a policy of separation of government from the enterprise.
However, as will be discussed below, this goal has been somewhat difficult to achieve.
 The term “scientific management” was coined to tackle the problems of "random
decision-making, relaxed management, undisciplined job performances, and low-level
managerial abilities"
82 inherent in SOEs.  Scientific management describes the goals of
achieving democratic decision-making processes, efficient execution, and strong supervision
over decision-making.  Reaching these goals requires establishment of effective mechanisms
of incentive and restraint, and checks and balances inside the corporate governance structure.
The Corporate Law of 1993 also provides generous privileges for SOE-corporatized
corporations, which are unavailable to other corporations.  For instance, "there must be five
or more sponsors for incorporating a publicly held corporation, while a waiver is granted
where a SOE is restructured into publicly held corporation."
83  Another example of a
privilege is that "publicly held corporation, a wholly State-owned corporation, and a closely
held corporation incorporated by two or more SOEs or State-owned investment entities may,
for the purpose of raising funds for its production and operation, issue corporate bonds."
84
Other closely held corporations are not qualified to issue corporate bonds.
  Beginning in early 1992, some SOEs began to be corporatized on pilot basis.  Since
1994, after implementation of the Corporate Law, government agencies have been making
further efforts to push forward SOE corporatization.  The Central government selected 100
SOEs for corporatization.
85  Based on a survey conducted by the Department of EnterpriseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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Reforms,
86 ninety-eight SOEs had been corporatized by the end of 1998.
87  One SOE became
bankrupt and the other failed to provide information for the survey.  Among the other SOEs,
sixteen were transformed into publicly held corporations, sixteen were transformed into
closely held corporations, and sixty-two were transformed into wholly State-owned
corporations with various subsidiaries.
88  Four SOEs still operate under the traditional
enterprise regime.
89  During the period between 1995 and 1998, forty-eight pilot SOEs were
transformed into listed corporations, or parent corporations of listed subsidiaries, and raised
funds of RMB 3.9 billion Yuan from overseas securities markets.
90
Corporate governance changes do not necessarily produce immediate profits, however.
In a survey conducted by the China Confederation of Enterprises in 1999 of over 1,235 SOE
managers (Confederation of Enterprises Survey),
91 only 14% of the managers reported better
corporate financial performance following the corporatization,
92 although 55% of the
respondents reported better corporate governance.
93
As a pillar of China's national economy, SOEs have significant social and political
implications for contemporary China.  However, due in large part to the side effects of several
decades of a highly centralized economy and radical changes in market conditions, many
SOEs have run into serious financial difficulties.  According to the Ministry of Finance,
"there are 238,000 non-commercial SOEs with RMB 13,500 billion Yuan (US$1,626.5
billion) of State assets in 1998.  The number of large SOEs is only 9,357, and medium-sized
and small SOEs account for 96% of total SOEs.  However, more than 45% of the assets are
owned by the smaller firms, which in many cases engage in low-level repetitive production
and are not competitive."
94  In early 1999, "about 49% of Chinese large and medium-sized
SOEs are suffering the loss."
95
Moreover, it appears that internal corporate governance itself is in need of improvement
in most SOEs.  For instance, although the governing corporate bodies in many SOE-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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corporatized corporations have been established, they do not function very well.  According
to a survey conducted by State Committee of Economy and Trade, only twenty-two of ninety-
eight corporations have been conducting meetings of shareholders.
96  Among the twenty-two
corporations which have been holding meetings of shareholders, the meetings have been
properly conducted in only eleven of these corporations.
97  The meetings of shareholders in
seven corporations have been relatively effective, and the meetings of shareholders in four
corporations have been moderately effective.
98
On the other hand, ninety of ninety-eight corporations have set up boards of directors.
Most boards of directors (seventy-five) have been functioning very well, while in the other
fifteen corporations, boards play a limited role.  Seventy-eight of the ninety-eight
corporations have set up boards of supervisors.  Two-thirds of the boards of supervisors have
been functioning well.
As far as the appointment of executives is concerned, government agencies have been
playing decisive roles in fifty-two corporations, and boards of directors have been playing
decisive roles in thirty-five corporations.  Other approaches have been adopted in ten
corporations.  In short, twenty-nine pilot corporations admit that their corporate bodies have
been functioning irregularly.
99
In addition to the 100 pilot samples mentioned above, other SOE-corporatized
corporations as well as listed corporations have been facing similar governance problems.
Although many SOEs have been transformed into business corporations, their managements
still tend to avoid the corporate governance requirements imposed by the Corporate Law and
retain the traditional SOE governance model.
100  Some listed corporations do not convene
regular meetings of board of directors, thus there is little check on managerial power.
101
There are also some directors who do not take the board meeting rules seriously.
102  In some
corporations, all directors act as managers and executives.
103  The excessive overlaps betweenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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directors and executives frequently cause problems of insider control and managerial
corruption.
104  In some cases, executives are employed in the parent corporation and the
subsidiary at the same time, and these dual positions greatly threaten and weaken the
shareholders’ powers.  In corporations with highly centralized shareholding structures, the
controlling shareholders are extremely dominant and, therefore, minority shareholders are
unable to enjoy proper protection.
105  Although several listed corporations, including
Zhongxing Communication Co., Jiangnan Heavy Industry Co., and Xiaoya Electricity Co.
have attempted to introduce independent directors and supervisors, the reality is that serious
governance problems still exist.
106
III.  Proposals for Governance Reform
  As noted above, in spite of current efforts at reform, improvements are needed in
Chinese corporate governance.  This Part identifies some of the issues that need to be
addressed in order to achieve further governance reform in SOE-corporatized corporations
and offers some modest suggestions.
A.  Repeal SOEs Law
The SOEs Law of 1988 was enacted in connection with the transitional model of
corporate governance whereas the Corporate Law of 1993 is aimed at governing modern
corporations.  Today, many SOEs are still governed by the SOEs Law and its regulations.  In
many cases, provisions of the Corporate Law and the SOEs Law and regulations conflict.
107
As a first step in reform, we propose that as China corporatizes its SOEs, the SOEs Law and
its subordinate regulations should be repealed.  Instead, all SOEs, should be governed by the
Corporate Law.  This not only simplifies corporate governance, it applies the most current
Chinese thinking to all of its corporate enterprises.
B.  Build Autonomy
Historically, the government has played a key role in corporate governance.  In theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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period of the planned economy, the civil society was almost replaced by the political state,
and SOEs and government agencies were to a great extent commingled.   Moreover, SOEs
were generally regarded as government branches.  Although some people described the
relationship between the government and SOE as "the relationship between a father and his
son," it is more accurate to describe it as the relationship between "a father and his hand,”
108
because an SOE, like a hand, did not have its own legal independence.   
China is in a transition period from a planned economy to a market economy.  Some
government agencies still treat SOE-corporatized corporations like traditional SOEs, and
control them in the traditional ways with excessive administrative power.  This control
includes requiring approval of decisions already made by the board of directors, bypassing
the general meeting of shareholders and directly appointing directors and executives, and
interfering with daily operations.  For example, a survey in early 1999 reveals that "of the
enterprises which are undergoing the reform of establishing a modern enterprise system,
officials are still nominated by government departments instead of the board of directors."
109
In the survey conducted by China Confederation of Enterprises, 46% of the respondent
managers replied that they preferred to be selected by the board of directors, and only 7%
said that they prefer to be selected by government agencies.
110  Approximately 51% of the
respondents believe that their most difficult job was to maintain a good relationship with
government agencies.
111  Although 56% of the managers said that excessive fee collection as
well as excessive fine and donation solicitation from the government agencies has been
mitigated, 11% of them believe that the problem is still very serious, and 33% believe that
this problem is still serious.
112  The survey also revealed that most managers are so busy
dealing with unlimited and repeated inspections and examinations organized by government
agencies that their business management is compromised.
113
The survey conducted by the Confederation of Enterprises also revealed that only 8% ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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the managers are fully satisfied with the government restructuring progress which began in
1998, 66% of the managers are basically satisfied with the process, and 25% are not
satisfied.
114  Approximately 13% of the respondents said that corporations are unable to be
independent from the government after government restructuring and SOE corporatization,
59% of the respondents are not sure about this question, and only 28% said that the
corporations will become independent from the government.
115
With respect to management activities, over 50% of respondent managers reported that
their SOEs have the right to buy materials, to sell products or services, to set up internal
bodies, to decide the employees' salary and bonus, and to dispose of the SOE-owned funds.
116
Around 25% of the respondent managers reported that their SOEs were unable to resist the
improper donation requests from the government or other organizations, or resist
governmental decisions with respect to joint ventures, mergers or disposition of enterprise
assets.  Approximately 81% of the respondent managers said that they are appointed by
government agencies.  The main reason for the absence of comprehensive business autonomy
in many SOEs is the old system of inseparability or commingling between government and
enterprises.
117  As these surveys demonstrate, there is still a long way to go before SOEs and
SOE-corporatized corporations become truly independent from the government agencies.
In order to build sound corporate governance and corporate autonomy, it is imperative to
disassociate business corporations from government agencies, to reduce government
intervention in business affairs, and substantially liberalize corporate business activities from
government control.  In fact, the Chinese government has recently recognized this principle,
and promised to separate the government from corporate functions.
118
Yet, as agents of the State shareholder, government agencies should be permitted to
exercise shareholders' rights on behalf the State shareholder, but not interfere in the daily
corporate management and operations, or intervene in lawful corporate decision-makingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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processes.  The State shareholder should enjoy the same shareholder rights as the private
investors.  In terms of personnel and financial controls, however, government agencies should
fully disassociate with the SOE-corporatized corporations under their control.
119
  In light of their public role, it is appropriate for government agencies to intervene in the
market in some ways, however.  Governmental intervention can be useful for providing:  (1)
respect for corporate autonomy; (2) protection of fair competition; (3) guidance of the micro-
economy; (4) facilitation of achievement of corporate goals; and (5) fulfillment of business
opportunities and other legitimate interests, including government procurement.
120  Micro-
control legislation should give equal attention to the controller and the controlled and
principles of legitimacy, efficiency, and fairness should be respected when government
intervention is introduced.
Given the difference in the legal nature between private right and public power, the
shareholder’s rights enjoyed by the State and the administrative powers possessed by
government agencies, should be separated, and should be exercised by different entities.  In
this regard, it is extremely important to identify the proper institutions or organizations acting
as the agents of State shareholder.
  C.  Redefine the Relationship Between Old and New Corporate Bodies
Prior to adoption of the Corporate Law, the main governance bodies in the traditional
SOEs were the committee of Communist Party, the trade union, and the meeting of
employees' representatives in the traditional SOEs.  As noted above, modern Chinese
corporations are now governed by the general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors,
and the board of supervisors.  However, the old corporate bodies continue to play a role.  It
has been held that "[p]arty organizations should perform duties according to the Party
Constitution, and trade unions and employees' congresses should carry out their respective
duties in accordance with relevant laws and regulations."
121  Yet overlap between the new andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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the old corporate bodies is still possible.  "Party committee leaders of wholly State-owned
corporations and State share-holding corporations can be included in [the] board of directors
and [the] board of supervisors in accordance with legal procedures, and employees'
representatives should be included in the boards of directors and supervisors."
122  Moreover,
"[t]he Party secretary and the Chair of board of directors can be the same person, but in
principle, the Chair of board of directors and chief executive officer should be two separate
people."
123  Despite the roles of the old governing bodies, "it is necessary to give full play to
the role of board of directors in making unified decisions on major issues and the effective
supervisory role of board of supervisors."
124  To achieve the objectives of the Corporate Law
reforms, the three new corporate bodies created by the Corporate Law should be permitted to
function independently.
D.  Improve the Function of the General Meeting of Shareholders
The general meeting of shareholders in China is considered the supreme sovereignty
in corporate governance, or “the organ of power of the corporation.”
125  The shareholders are
provided the following comprehensive decision-making powers at the general meeting by
statute:  (1) to make decisions regarding corporate policies on business operation and
investment plans; (2) to elect and replace directors and to determine their remuneration; (3) to
elect and replace shareholder supervisors and to determine their remuneration; (4) to examine
and approve the reports of board of directors and of the board of supervisors; (5) to examine
and approve plans of corporate fiscal financial budget and final accounts; (6) to examine and
approve plans of corporate profit distribution and of making up of losses; (7) to make
resolutions on the increase or the reduction of the corporation’s registered capital; (8) to
decide whether to issue corporate bonds; (9) to make decisions regarding corporate mergers,
divisions, dissolution and liquidation; and (10) to amend corporate memorandum of
associations.
126William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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In the United States, some of these powers, such as the power to approve plans of
corporate profit distribution and the power to determine the directors' remuneration, are
reserved to the board of directors, rather than the shareholders.  The rationale behind this
institutional arrangement in China is that the shareholders are considered the ultimate source
of authority.  In other words, the powers enjoyed by the board of directors and the board of
supervisors are derived from the shareholders, and not from the legislature.  This corporate
governance philosophy resembles the political governance philosophy expressed by the
Chinese Constitution.  Pursuant to the Constitution, the "NPC is the supreme State power
organ."
127  "All the executive branches, judiciary branches and procurator branches shall be
elected by people's congress, responsible to people's congress, and are subject to the
supervision by people's congress."
128 In other words, the NPC is the supreme power center in
the Chinese political life.  All other state bodies derive their powers from the NPC.  Given the
similarities between the governance structure in the political states and that in business
corporations, it was natural for the Chinese legislature to translate the rationale of the
political governance regime into the corporate life, and to compare the meeting of
shareholders to the NPC.
As Chinese Corporate Law undergoes further revision, the question is whether the
general meeting of shareholders should keep its current powers, or whether some powers,
especially substantial managerial powers, should be transferred to the board of directors.  It is
reasonable to maintain the status quo in order to deal with excessive managerial power,
particularly during a transitional period.  However, it may be wise to consider the corporate
governance arrangements in other legal systems, and perhaps reduce some powers currently
possessed by the shareholders, in order to harmonize the Chinese system of corporate
governance with global investment requirements.
We propose some refinement in the Corporate Law.  The current Corporate Law listsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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statutory powers enjoyed by the shareholders and the board of directors.  By granting various
powers to both bodies, it is unclear which body prevails in the case of conflict.  For example,
if the board of directors exercises the powers not prescribed by the legislature and makes a
decision, it will become an open question regarding whether the shareholders will have the
power to repeal the decision.  Another question under Chinese law concerns whether the
shareholders may exercise the powers provided exclusively to the board of directors.  Under
the current Chinese legislation, the answer to each of these questions is that the shareholders
may repeal decisions of the board of directors and even exercise powers purportedly reserved
exclusively to the board.  To avoid unnecessary power struggles between the corporate
bodies, one option is to limit the powers of the shareholders to the items prescribed by the
legislature, and reserve all other managerial powers to the board of directors, while reserving
all other supervisory powers to board of supervisors.
Another issue concerns the practical realities of the general meeting of the shareholders.
For example, although according to written law the general meeting of shareholders is very
powerful in China, in reality the meeting is often simply a rubber stamp for the wishes of the
majority of shareholders.  There is little or no opportunity for minority shareholders to be
heard.  Oppression of minority shareholders is a serious issue.
 As noted by a reporter from the China Securities Daily, the meetings of shareholders can
be quite boring.
129  First, the reporter observed that there is an increasing number of inside
shareholders, namely, employee shareholders, amicable to management attending the
meetings, and that the number of minority shareholders and outside shareholders attending
the meetings is declining.
130  He cited an example of a meeting of shareholders where seven
auditing reporters attended the meeting, while only six participating shareholders were in
attendance.
131  Second, the reporter found that the proceedings were often very mechanical --
the Chair or the CEO always read the already published annual report, without adding anyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
22
meaningful discussion regarding development, planning, the budget or management goals for
the coming year.  After reading the report, the Chair or CEO usually asked the shareholders to
vote without offering them an opportunity to ask questions.  Finally, shareholders rarely
asked questions during the meetings.  For instance, in five of the seven shareholder meetings
audited by this reporter, no shareholder asked a single question.
132  Moreover, the voting
results were almost always 100% in favor of the resolutions proposed by management.
133
There are several possible explanations for the inactivity of shareholders at the general
meeting.  In addition to factors such as time, travel expenses and inability to influence results,
the main explanation may be that management appears indifferent to the concerns of minority
shareholders.  Some directors refuse to disclose more information than published in the
annual reports, believing that they will have fewer difficulties with shareholders if they
present them with minimal information.
134  However, in recent years, some minority
shareholders have begun taking their rights more seriously.  For instance, when Shengli Co.
convened its 2000 meeting of shareholders, many minority shareholders attended either
personally, or sent agents or representatives.
135  Fifteen hundred shareholders representing
26,260,000 shares appointed their agents to cast votes on their behalf.
136  Furthermore, at
least twenty shareholders each holding fewer than 100 shares attended the meeting of
shareholders.
137
In order to provide guidelines for meetings of shareholders in listed corporations, the
Chines Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Standard Opinions on Meeting
of Shareholders in Listed Corporations (Standard Opinions) on February 23, 1998, and
amended it on May 18, 2000.
138  This document has enhanced the Corporate Law in a number
of respects.  For example, the Standard Opinions recognize the minority shareholders' right to
request the board of directors to hold a special meeting of shareholders.
139  If the board of
directors denies the request, the qualified shareholder may notify the other shareholders andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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convene the special meeting.  Unfortunately, the purpose of the Standard Opinions, as evident
from inclusion of the word "opinions," in its name, is to "guide the listed corporations to
convene meetings of shareholders."
140  Thus, it is very difficult to classify its requirements as
mandatory, or even legally binding.  Given the sophisticated problems associated with the
meeting of shareholders and the insufficiency of regulations governing this issue, it is
necessary to further improve these rules.  We therefore propose a number of amendments to
the Corporate Law to address these issues.
Our first proposal is to incorporate the Standard Opinions into the Corporate Law.  This
would help make the requirements of the Standard Opinions and the Corporate Law
consistent and coherent.  After the revision of the Standard Opinions in May 2000, the first
reported case of a special meeting of shareholders convened by the shareholders, instead of
by the board of directors, occurred.  This was the meeting of the shareholders of Xingfu
Shiye Corporation.
141  Mingliu Investment Limited Corporation owned 60 million of 312.8
million outstanding shares of Xingfu Shiye Corporation.  After Mingliu's proposal to convene
a special meeting of shareholders was denied by the board of directors, Mingliu proceeded to
send out the notices and convened a special meeting of shareholders as provided by the
Standard Opinions.
142 Some commentators considered this a positive event because it meant
that the board of directors was not the sole decision-maker regarding convention of special
meetings of shareholders.
143
Next, shareholders should be excluded from voting on issues in which they are interested
parties to curb the increasing number of interest-conflicting transactions in listed
corporations, also as provided in the Standard Opinions.  Current legal rules focus only on
information disclosure, and make it easy for some parent corporations to allocate their profits
on their business transactions with their subsidiaries.  The Standard Opinions provide that
"the shareholders who are the parties to the business transactions between themselves and theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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listed corporations, should not cast their votes on such transactions, and the votes held by
such shareholders should not be included in the total votes represented by the shareholders at
the meeting of shareholders."
144
Further, the shareholder's right to question management and to offer proposals should be
strengthened.  These two rights, alongside with the right to information, are mentioned in the
Corporate Law only generally.
145  To make these rules more workable, the rules should be
delineate appropriate procedures for shareholders submission of proposals and requests for
information.
  A cumulative voting mechanism for the election of directors might also be made
available to provide minority shareholders a voice in corporate governance.  The current
Corporate Law is silent on this point.  This provision could be made optional, as is true
generally throughout the United States.
146
Finally, detailed provisions should cover issues such as solicitation of proxies, the
validity of voting agreements, and exceptions to the general rule of "one share, one vote" (for
example, non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, corporate self-owned shares, interlocking
shares, etc.).  Additionally, modern telecommunication technologies, especially Internet
services and video conference technologies, might be considered as alternative ways to
provide for the meetings of shareholders to make it easier for the minority shareholders to
participate in the corporate decision-making process.  Modern telecommunication
technologies could be employed alongside with the traditional face-to-face general meetings
of shareholders.
E.  Recognition of Multiple Legal Representatives
Both the chair of the board of directors and the CEO are statutory and indispensable
corporate positions in China.  The Chair holds the following statutory powers:  (1) to chair
the meeting of shareholders and to convene and chair the meetings of board of directors;
147William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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(2) to examine the implementation of resolutions passed by the board of directors;
148 (3) to
sign shares and bonds issued by the corporation;
149 (4) to act as the sole corporate legal
representative;
150 and (5) to exercise some powers of the board of directors under the
authorization from the board when the board is not in session.
151  In addition, the Chair, as a
member of the board of directors, may cast one vote at the board meetings.
152  Decisions are
made by majority rule.
153
 The position of the CEO can be described as follows.  The CEO is an agent of the
corporation and enjoys the rights conferred by the Corporate Law
154 and the corporate
memorandum of associations.  As an employee, the CEO enjoys the rights and interests
recognized through the employment contract and by labor laws.  Under the Corporate Law,
the CEO takes general responsibility for daily corporate operations.
155  Further, the CEO is
hired and dismissed by the board of directors,
156 and therefore is responsible to the board.
157
  Because the Corporate Law recognizes the Chair as the sole corporate legal
representative, some Chairs believe that they are the paramount corporate leaders and usurp
the authority of the shareholders and directors.
158  In other words, they confuse the position of
legal representative recognized by the SOEs Law and that recognized by the Corporate Law.
Under the SOEs Law, the manager, as the only legal representative in SOEs, not only has the
authority to represent the SOEs in transactions with third parties, but also enjoys paramount
decision-making and executive power.  One fundamental change introduced by the Corporate
Law is that managerial powers have been redistributed between several corporate bodies.
The power to represent the corporation under the SOEs Law is held by the Chair of the board
of directors.  The general meeting of shareholders holds the most fundamental decision-
making power.  The CEO holds the detailed daily decision-making power.  The board of
directors holds the mid-level decision making powers.  The traditional internal executive
powers are divided again between board of directors and CEO.  Therefore, the powerWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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attached to the legal representative, namely, the Chair of the board of directors, has been
greatly reduced.
Under current legislation, however, the Chair is the only corporate legal representative
authorized to execute contracts and other legal documents on behalf of the corporation.  If
other directors are required to represent the corporation in legal relationships with third
parties, they must receive a special authorization from the Chair.  It is thus inconvenient for a
corporation to enter transactions when the legislation permits only a single legal
representative.  Thus, law reform should include recognition of multiple corporate legal
representatives, in order to achieve transaction efficiency and to provide safeguards for third
parties in the market.
F.  Improve the Role of the Board of Directors
1.  The function of the board of directors
As mentioned above, the general meeting of shareholders is intended to be the power
center in corporations under the Corporate Law.  This institutional arrangement may be
reasonable and feasible for closely held corporations with few shareholders.  However, it is
time consuming, expensive, and inflexible for corporations to respond to frequent market
changes and other business environments if shareholders are required to meet on every
significant managerial decision.  In general, in the U.S., although "all corporate powers shall
be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the
articles of incorporation,"
159 much corporate power is delegated to senior officers.  According
to the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act "the management of the business of a publicly
held corporation should be conducted by or under the supervision of such principal senior
executives as are designated by the board of directors, and by those other executives and
employees to whom the management function is delegated by the board or those executives,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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subject to the functions and powers of the board . . . ."
160
If China were to follow the American approach as a possible solution to the problem, the
Chinese legislature would need to reallocate the powers between the meeting of shareholders
and the board of directors, and thus transfer all the ordinary business managerial powers from
the shareholders to the board of directors.  Because the CEO also enjoys substantial
managerial powers under the current Corporate Law, it is possible that there will be a conflict
between the board of directors and CEO when both of them perform statutory powers.  To
avoid these power struggles, it is essential that the legislation define the powers of the CEO
in a coherent way.  Thus, the board of directors, instead of the shareholders, should become
the power center in the future Chinese corporate governance, and the board should have the
authority to delegate some managerial powers to the CEO or to other senior executives.  The
board of directors should also have the authority to supervise the performance of individual
directors, the CEO and other executives.
In the U.S., committees of the board of directors, including executive committees, audit
committees, nominating and compensation committees, "are assuming increasingly important
roles in the governance of publicly held corporations."
161  However, the Corporate Law is
silent on whether a Chinese board of directors is authorized to appoint committees to assist
the board in making informed and conscientious decisions.  No Chinese corporation, except
for overseas listed corporations, has reportedly appointed committees.  Nevertheless, the
boards of directors in overseas-listed corporations are encouraged to set up necessary
professional committees with respect to matters such as strategic decision-making, auditing,
and other issues, in order to improve corporate long-term development strategies.
162  In light
of the U.S. experience, it may be efficient to authorize boards of directors to act through
committees of directors, but to also specify the nondelegable powers to be exclusively
exercised by the full board in order to protect shareholders' rights from being injured byWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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excessive committee powers.  As the Corporate Law recognizes the board of supervisors as a
comprehensive corporate body, the audit committee under the board of directors (similar to
that in the U.S.), should serve under the supervision of the board of supervisors.  To hold
directors accountable and diligent, it may also be advisable for Corporate Law to adopt a
provision similar to that of section 8.25(f) of the Model Business Corporation Act in the U.S.
to provide that "the creation of, delegation of authority to, or action by a committee does not
alone constitute compliance by a director with the standards of conduct."
163
2.  Independence
In the U.S., as well as in other legal systems, outside directors play active and decisive
roles in the governance of large publicly held corporations.  According to a 1999 survey
conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
average percentage of independent directors on the board of directors is 62% in the U.S., 34%
in the United Kingdom, and 29% in France.
164  Corporate Law in China has no mandatory
requirements for appointing outside directors in large publicly held corporations.
Since March 29, 1999, the CSRC began to require overseas-listed corporations to
“increase the number of outside directors.  When the board of directors concludes its term of
service, outside directors should hold more than half the board seats with at least two
independent directors.”
165  In order to prevent outside directors from becoming figureheads,
the CSRC provided that “an outside director should have sufficient time and necessary
knowledge to perform his/her duties.  [To assist the] outside director [in] perform[ing] his/her
duties, the corporation must supply [all] necessary information and materials.”
166  In addition
to imposing qualification requirements for outside directors, the CSRC also granted
substantial powers to outside directors.  For instance, according the CSRC "the views of an
independent director should be specified in the board resolution.”  Moreover, a related
transaction of the corporation may not take effect until approved by an independent director.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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Two or more independent directors may propose that the board of directors call for a special
meeting of shareholders.  Independent directors may directly report to the meeting of
shareholders, the CSRC and other relevant agencies.
167
These CSRC requirements apply only to overseas-listed corporations.  As far as
domestically-listed corporations are concerned, the Guidelines on Memorandum of
Associations in Listed Corporations provides an optional article according to which "the
listed corporations may appoint independent directors when it deems it necessary."
168
However, it has no requirement for a minimum number of outside directors, nor requirements
regarding their duties.  In October, 2000, the State Committee of Economy and Trade
permitted SOE-corporatized corporations to "have independent directors, who are
independent from the shareholders, and take no position in the corporation."
169  In reality,
some listed corporations voluntarily elect some independent scholars to serve as independent
and outside directors, and encourage them to play active roles.  For example, in Xiao Tian'e
Corporation, six out of the twelve members of the board are independent directors, and three
directors may act together to veto board resolutions.
170
However, many independent directors find it difficult to exert any substantial influence,
other than symbolic, with the board.
171  According to a senior Chinese economist and a
former independent director in Lanzhou-based Huanghe Co., the independent outside
directors are dispensable, and they only play a very limited role on the boards of most listed
corporations in China.
172  This former director personally served as an independent director
for approximately only six months in Lanzhou-based Huanghe Co.
173  When the Chair and
the CEO of the company ran into serious confrontations, the independent outside directors
could not function, and this director felt he had no choice but to resign.
174  Moreover, during
his six months of service, he only had one opportunity to attend the meeting of board of
directors.
175William Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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The indispensable position of outside and independent directors in listed corporations
should be recognized by the Corporate Law on a mandatory basis.  In order to provide
outside directors with stronger powers, the legislature should determine a statutory minimum
percentage of independent and outside directors in listed corporations.  Nevertheless, a
significant challenge will be balancing the need to encourage independent directors to play a
more significant role in listed corporations while avoiding corruption.  For this purpose, both
sufficient remuneration and enforcement of legal duties are essential for independent
directors.
G.  Provide Restraint and Incentive Mechanisms for Directors and Executives
Unfortunately, in Chinese SOEs and SOE-corporatized corporations, it is common for
directors and executives to misuse their powers and to seek personal gain, or to even seize
corporate property.
176  For instance, some SOE directors and managers control the power to
appoint and dismiss treasurers, and therefore have the means to force treasurers to keep
several different accounting books for fraudulent purposes.
177  For example, in one case,
some perfect machines were sold as steel rubbish, while the corporation purchased more raw
materials than it could use in the next several hundred years.
178 Some directors and
executives made great personal profits during the process of corporate asset restructuring.
179
In one typical case, a former CEO of Anqing Paper Industry Corporation decided to
establish three branches of the corporation, costing the corporation approximately
$1,000,000, although no profit was generated.
180  He also invested over $1,000,000 in
technology innovation, but the company has yet to produce a qualified product.
181  In
addition, he also entered into a purchase of waste paper for the corporation from someone
with whom he had a personal relationship, at an extremely high price.
182
Some SOE officers behave appropriately during most of the SOE life, but become
corrupted just before their retirement.
183  Because many corrupted directors and executivesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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are approximately fifty-nine years old, their "sunset misbehavior" is referred to as the
“phenomenon of fifty-nine."
184  Moreover, many corrupted directors and executives are
famous figures, and serve in several leadership positions at the same time, including Chair,
CEO, secretary of the Communist Party Committee, chief of government agencies, etc.
185  In
some SOEs, the Chairs and CEOs hold supreme managerial power, and other corporate
bodies are unable to successfully challenge their authority.
186
The irresponsibility of directors and executives has resulted in insolvency or bankruptcy
of many SOEs.  A survey conducted by the Anhui Province authorities in 1997 revealed that
directors and executives were responsible for more than half of the insolvency or bankruptcy
cases in 110 SOEs.
187  In addition, many managers in SOEs and SOE-corporatized
corporations are unhappy with their current situation.  In the Confederation of Enterprises
Survey, 83% of the respondent managers said that the biggest obstacle for the growth of first
rate of directors and executives in China is the lack of an effective incentive and disciplinary
mechanism; and 77% of them prefer more generous annual salary as the major form of their
compensation.
188  Thus, current managers are almost equally concerned about both sound
incentives and disciplinary rules for Chinese directors and executives.
1.  Accountability
In the U.S., directors and officers are deemed fiduciaries of the corporation because their
relationship with the corporation and its shareholders is one of trust and confidence.  As
fiduciaries, directors and officers owe and legal duties to the corporation and the
shareholders.  These fiduciary duties include the duty of care and the duty of loyalty,
189 and
directors and officers are held personally accountable for breach of these duties.  In contract,
in the Chinese traditional planned economy, the legislation was silent with respect to the
duties and obligations of directors and executives.  It has been common for directors and
executives who have caused damage to one enterprise, to be appointed by governmentWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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agencies to serve in another enterprise.
190  Legal liability, including civil liability, has been
rarely imposed on wrongdoers or corrupted directors and executives.
In light of the significant deficiencies in the traditional governance structure of SOEs, the
Corporate Law provided for a number of provisions relating to the duties of directors,
supervisors and officers.
191  It also introduced some provisions dealing with the legal
liabilities against them, including civil, criminal and administrative liabilities.
192
Unfortunately, the Chinese Corporate Law is silent on the director's duty of care, and
does not provide a workable test for monitoring directors' performance.  In order to curb the
incidents of misuse of corporate powers, it is necessary to employ mechanisms to hold the
management of SOEs accountable for their behavior.  China might therefore consider the
U.S. approach to the duty of care and require directors and officers to exercise the degree of
care in accordance with the knowledge, diligence and experience expected from an ordinarily
prudent director in a similar position, and under similar circumstances, and hold them
personally accountable if the fail to do so.
193
The governing corporate bodies should assert claims whenever the corporate interest is
damaged or threatened by directors or executives' breach of duties.  However, it is possible
that the board of directors may refuse or fail to do so due to the amicable relationships
between the wrongdoing directors and the remaining directors.  The same phenomenon may
occur with respect to the board of supervisors, when some supervisors are close friends of the
wrongdoing director.
   In the U.S., shareholders have a right, under certain circumstances, to bring a derivative
action when the corporation suffers a wrong not redressed by the corporate directors.
194
Influenced by the U.S. experience, Japan introduced derivative actions in 1950, with
revisions in 1993.
195   Currently, the Chinese Corporate Law is silent on the issue of
shareholder derivative suits.  However, this silence has not prevented the Chinese courts fromWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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hearing shareholders’ derivative actions.
Nevertheless, Chinese shareholders are not very active in pursuing derivative actions.  If
China wishes to make derivative actions available to shareholders to provide a check on
managerial abuse, it is necessary that the Chinese legislature provide some clear procedural
rules.
2.  Compensation
One of the most serious problems with corporate governance in China is that many
directors and executives are underpaid.  In the forty-nine published annual reports of listed
corporations for the financial year of 1998, forty-five listed corporations reported the salary
of their directors and senior executives.
196  According to the report, 47% of the directors and
senior executives received annual compensation below RMB 30,000 Yuan (about US$
3,500), 29% received annual compensation ranging from RMB 30,000 Yuan (about US$
3,500) to RMB 50,000 Yuan (about US$ 6,000), 13% earned annual compensation ranging
from RMB 50,000 Yuan (about US$ 6,000) to RMB 100,000 Yuan (about US$ 12,000), and
11% received over RMB 100,000 Yuan (about US$ 12,000) of annual compensation.  For
instance, the Chair of the board of directors of China Light Motor Group Co. earned 40,000
Yuan (about US$ 4,500) as annual compensation in 1998, while his corporation sold 1.5
million motorcycles that year.  The chair of another corporation, Houjian, earned only RMB
39,000 Yuan (about US$ 4,400) as annual compensation in 1998, while his corporation sold
RMB 8.2 billion (about US$ 1 billion) of products that year.
197
Since many Chinese directors and executives are underpaid, some of them are tempted to
seek illegal income.  Unreasonable compensation is likely to be one of the major reasons for
the “phenomenon of fifty-nine."  For instance, the former Chair and CEO of Hongta Tobacco
Corporation, embezzled US$ 1.7 million in corporate funds.  His total lawful compensation
during the seventeen years of serving his corporation was RMB 800,000 Yuan (aboutWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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US$96,000), while the corporation made profits of RMB 80 billion Yuan (about US$9.6
billion).  In other words, his lawful income accounted for a mere 0.001 percentage of the total
corporation’s income.
198
It is essential to improve the compensation mechanism for directors and executives.  To
help attain this objective, innovative compensation mechanisms, such as stock option
programs, might be made available to directors and executives in most SOE-corporatized
corporations.  In spite of their adoption by foreign-invested enterprises in China, stock option
programs are relatively new to many SOEs and SOE-corporatized corporations.  In Beijing,
ten enterprises have been attempting to implement the stock option contract system, including
Bofei Instrument-Making Corporation, Beijing Switch Gear Share-holding Limited
Corporation, Tongzhou Subsidiary Corporation of Tongrentang, Shuangqiao Pharmaceutical
Factory, Zhongguancun Real Estate Corporation, and Caishikou Department Store.
199 Among
these corporations, Zhongguancun Real Estate Corporation and Caishikou Department Store
have recently cancelled the project because their managers were concerned about their
value.
200
According to a typical stock ownership plan, SOE managers receive a certain amount of
stocks in installments at a fixed price during their tenure and can earn profits on these stocks
in the future.
201  The managers must reinvest the profits in the enterprise by transferring them
into new shares during the first three years.
202  The managers are also responsible for losses
incurred during that period.
203  Only after the managers' performance is considered
satisfactory, may they cash in their stocks or reinvest the profits in the enterprise two years
after they leave the post.
204  Shanghai also carried out a trial reform rewarding senior
executives of enterprises with stock options.  "Directors of listed corporations, are given a
certain number of shares, but they can only be cashed in years later, sometimes even after
their retirement.  Passing a strict and comprehensive long-term assessment of the director'sWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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working performance is the prerequisite for obtaining the reward."
205
Stock option programs should be implemented nationwide.  The legislature should offer
guidelines for the content and validity of stock option contracts.  For example, the legislature
should provide guidelines on methods for determining proper rewards.  Relatively moderate
rewards may be unattractive to the directors and executives, while overly generous ones may
be unfair to shareholders and employees.  In assessing the performance of directors and
executives, strong supervision is also necessary to ensure the objectivity and impartiality of
the appraisal process.
H.  Improve the Role of the Board of Supervisors
The board of supervisors is an indispensable corporate body in the Chinese corporate
governance structure.  Pursuant to the Corporate Law, the supervisors shall perform the
following duties:  (1) examine the corporate financial affairs; (2) supervise directors and
executives' breaches of statutes or memorandum of associations in performing their duties;
(3) demand directors and executives to redress their misconduct damaging the corporate
interest; (4) propose special meetings of the shareholders; and (5) other duties as stipulated in
memorandum of associations.  Supervisors also have the power to audit the meeting of board
of directors.
206  The board of supervisors includes shareholder representatives and certain
employee representatives, with the percentage of representation of each group to be stipulated
in the memorandum of association.  The employee representatives are elected by the
corporate employees in democratic elections.
207  In order to secure the impartiality of
supervisors, "directors, executives or financial officers may not concurrently serve as
supervisors."
208
As an efficient watchdog for the corporation and shareholders, the board of supervisors
should obtain meaningful tools for confronting problems associated with insider control.
However, the current supervisory mechanism is generally incapable of identifying andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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addressing managerial corruption.  As a survey conducted by State Committee of Economy
and Trade indicated, some SOE-corporatized corporations have no boards of supervisors, and
one-third of those with boards of supervisors have difficulties performing their supervisory
duties.
209  In the absence of meaningful supervisory mechanisms, many SOE-corporatized
corporations have been faced with serious problems of corruption.
210  For instance, hundreds
of millions of dollars of corporate funds were misused by the senior executives in Zhengzhou
Baiwen Corporation in Henan Province.
211  Therefore, further legislative reform with respect
to rules governing the board of directors is necessary.
First, having outside supervisors in the board of supervisors should be mandatory for
large publicly held corporations.  To achieve impartial supervision, the supervisors should be
completely independent from the directors and executives.  Supervisors should have strong
expertise in essential matters, such as corporate management, corporate finance or business
law.
Second, the powers possessed by the board of supervisors should be redefined.  The
current supervisory powers recognized by the Corporate Law are of a postmortem and
passive nature.  To enable supervisors to obtain relevant and crucial information, the board of
directors should be obligated to report to the board of supervisors on a regular basis.
Moreover, the board of supervisors should have authority to take legal actions against
directors or executives on behalf of the corporation.  The board of supervisors should become
a corporate body between the shareholders and the board of directors in the corporate
hierarchy, and should hold the power to appoint and dismiss directors.  The board of
supervisors should also hold statutory decision-making powers with respect to fundamental
investment decisions or transaction plans.  In addition to comprehensive supervision over
managerial activity, the board of supervisors should be required to supervise the financial and
accounting activities.  In order to fulfill their obligations, the board of supervisors should beWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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permitted to employ outside advisers, such as lawyers, auditors, and accountants.
In order to strengthen the State shareholder's supervision of SOEs, the State has begun to
send special inspectors to supervise traditional SOEs and SOE-corporatized corporations.
212
The State Council appointed the first group of twenty-one special inspectors to large SOEs on
April 28, 1998.
213  The main duties of the inspectors have been to conduct financial
supervision of enterprise operations on behalf of the State, and evaluate the senior executives'
performance in terms of legality and administrative capability.  The inspectors have not been
involved in the production or management of the enterprises.  Vice-minister level officers are
qualified to serve as special inspectors.  Each inspector has four special assistants, which are
chosen from officials with professional backgrounds in banking, finance, personnel, auditing
and supervisory bodies, and macro-control agencies.  The inspector and the four assistants
form a special inspector's office, and are generally responsible for supervising five
enterprises.  The term of office for a special inspector and assistants is three years, and they
may not serve a second term in the same enterprise.  Members of the special inspector's office
cannot hold a position in the enterprise they supervise, and may not accept any compensation,
benefits, entertainment or gifts from the enterprise.
214
The inspectors have been very harsh in supervising and investigating the management of
their supervised corporations.  We propose that special inspectors should be replaced by the
board of supervisors in the future.  There is no need to have both supervisory authorities,
provided that the board of supervisors actually functions as a supervisory body.
I.  The State as a Shareholder
In China, the State acts as a majority shareholder in many listed corporations.
215  This
situation will probably remain unchanged in the near future.  State shareholder status may
trigger a number of conflicts of interest -- on the one hand, the government may be concerned
about whether the State is sufficiently protected as a shareholder of the enterprise, and on theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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other hand, minority shareholders and potential investors may be concerned about potential
misuse of the controlling shareholder position by the State.
216  Both concerns are
understandable.  Protective and restrictive mechanisms are, therefore, indispensable with
respect to the State shareholder.
1.  Conceptual orientation:  differentiating the State shareholders’ rights from
traditional property ownership
There are three basic forms of State ownership in China:  (1) traditional property
ownership; (2) creditor’s rights; and (3) shareholder's  rights.  Upon corporatization of SOEs,
the State’s property ownership over SOEs is that of a shareholder.  As a shareholder, the State
may not directly control, utilize or dispose corporate property.  The State shareholder may
exercise its right to dividends and net assets, the right to governance participation, and other
shareholder rights.
When the State owns a large portion of the shares of SOE-corporatized corporations, it is
very easy for the State (or the State agent) to exercise dominant influence on the corporation.
The China Confederation of Enterprises Survey showed that "61.33% of respondent
managers say that government and corporations need to be further separated, [and] 59.67% of
respondent managers say that the establishment and duties of State shareholder's agents need
further improvement."
217  As a feasible investment policy for State shareholders, shares held
by the State exceeding a certain percentage might be required to be held as non-voting
preference shares.  Non-voting preference shares may be very helpful in preventing the State
shareholder from misusing its controlling position yet ensure the State’s right to dividends
and net assets.
To facilitate the relationship between SOE-corporatized corporations and the State
shareholder, it is essential for the State shareholder to respect corporate property rights.  The
Corporate Law provides that “a corporation, as a legal person, shall enjoy corporate propertyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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rights regarding all the properties formed by the shareholders' investments, and possess civil
rights and bear the civil liabilities in accordance with the law."
218  The language “corporate
property rights” was introduced for the first time in China by the Corporate Law.
The Corporate Law also states that "the ownership of State-owned assets in a corporation
shall vest in the State.”
219  This statement is imprecise, or even misleading, because it ignores
the difference between shareholders' rights and corporate property ownership.  However, the
Corporate Law also states that “a corporation shall, with all its corporate assets, operate
independently and be responsible for its own profits and losses according to law.  A
corporation shall, under the macro-adjustment and control of the State, organize its
production and operation independently in accordance with market demand for the purpose of
raising economic benefits and labor productivity, maintaining and increasing the value of its
assets."
220 This provision implies that the above-mentioned clause regarding vesting of State-
owned assets was included in the Corporate Law to confirm the shareholder's rights enjoyed
by the State -- not to permit the State to take away the corporate property rights of the
corporation.
221
2.  The limited scope of wholly State-owned corporations
In China, "the State economy is over-distributed, with its overall quality not so high, and
the distribution of resources is not reasonable enough, a situation which must be tackled with
great effort."
222  Many Chinese SOE managers therefore prefer that SOEs withdraw from
competitive industries.  The Confederation of Enterprises Survey found that "81.29% of
respondents prefer that the SOE withdraw from general competitive industries, 16.22% do
not believe that the SOEs should withdraw from general competitive industries, and 1.87%
prefer that SOEs withdraw even from the monopoly industries of the national economy, the
people's livelihood and the national defense."
223  Thus, most respondents support the idea that
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shareholders.  This trend may help reduce the State's investment risks, and create more
investment opportunities to private investors.  With respect to the question of the most
suitable shareholder structure for SOE corporatized corporations, "63.88% of respondents
prefer multiple shareholders, 22.55% prefer State-invested corporation as the majority
shareholder, 7.1% prefer State as the majority shareholder, 6.47% prefer private shareholders,
and 55.35% prefer most medium-sized and small SOEs to be transferred to individuals or
partners."
224
The Chinese government also endorses the strategy of developing sound corporate
governance by encouraging multiple shareholder structures in SOE-corporatized
corporations.  "Diversity of equities is conducive to the formation of a standardized corporate
governance.  It is necessary to develop corporations featuring multiple investing entities,
except for a small number of enterprises that should be monopolized by the State."
225
Nevertheless, some SOEs have been restructured into wholly State-owned corporations.
226
One reason is that SOE managers prefer to maintain the traditional governance structure and
government agencies prefer to maintain traditional control over wholly State-owned
corporations.  Another reason is the misinterpretation of the second paragraph of Article 64 of
Corporate Law
 227 which provides that "corporations manufacturing special products
determined by the State Council, or corporations belonging to the category of specialized
industries, shall take the form of wholly State-owned corporations."
 228
The wholly State-owned corporation form should be restricted exclusively to industries
promoting national and public interests, while all other SOEs should be transformed into
corporations with more than one shareholder, or to publicly held corporations, including
listed corporations.  To pursue this goal, it is necessary to relinquish the existing quota control
regarding initial public offerings in the Chinese securities market, and allow all corporations
satisfying the statutory listing requirements to be listed at the securities exchanges.
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general principles and regulations governing the legal relationships between common
shareholders should be equally applicable to the relationship between State-shareholder and
other shareholders.
3.  Parent-Subsidiary Control
The corporate bodies of some SOE subsidiaries are under the direct control of their
parent corporation.  In response to this problem, the CSRC requires listed corporations to be
independent from their parent corporations in terms of "independent personnel (renyuan
duli), independent assets (zichan wanzheng) and independent finance (caiwu duli). "
230
However, "the three separation requirements are insufficient especially with respect to listed
corporations with highly concentrated share-holding and listed corporations in the industries
of steel, petrochemical and power."
231  The excessive connections between listed corporations
and their parent corporations have caused serious problems for some of the creditors and the
minority shareholders of these corporations.  For instance, the 1999 annual report of Daqing
Lianyi Co. revealed that the largest majority shareholder stole RMB 620 million Yuan from
this corporation, accounting for 50% its total corporate assets.
232
There are many reasons for the excessively close connections between listed
corporations and their parent corporations.  First, the shareholding structure of listed
corporations is not diverse enough to prevent parent corporations from firmly controlling key
decisions in their subsidiaries, including personnel decisions.  In contrast, corporations with a
highly diversified shareholding structure have clearer boundaries between their parent
corporations.  Examples of corporations that clearly respect the boundaries between parents
and subsidiaries include Shenwanke,
233 Aishi Gufen,
234 and Fangzheng Keji.
235
Second, to reduce the transaction costs, some listed corporations would like to rely on the
procuring and marketing networks established by their parent corporations.
236  Third, some
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to present "satisfied profits."  Fourth, most listed corporations were formally separated from
their parent corporations when they initially incorporated, but have always acted as small
factories or small parts in the broader framework of the parent corporations.  Thus, the parent
corporations regard the listed corporations as small isolated islands surrounded by the parent
corporations.
237  Fifth, some powerful executives act as Chair, CEO and Party Committee
Secretary in both the subsidiary and the parent corporation.  Their dual positions make it
impossible to separate the listed corporations from their parent corporations.
238  Further,
many people argue that "the separation between the listed corporations and the parent
corporations will be a long and hard process"
239 and thus "the excessive connections between
them will not be fundamentally changed in the near future."
240  Yet, although Chinese
legislation does not recognize veil-piercing theory, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
might be imposed to hold the parent corporation accountable for the debts of the subsidiary in
cases where the corporate boundaries are not respected.
241
4.  Transferability of State-owned shares
At the present time, there are various classifications of shares in Chinese listed
corporations.  Some shares are transferable
242 while others, including those owned by the
State, are not.  As indicated in Table 1 below, the total nontransferable equity of listed
corporations was 166.484 billion shares, accounting for 65.89% of the total equity of listed
corporations by the end of 1998, including 86.551 billion shares owned by government,
71.617 billion shares owned by legal persons,
243 and 8.317 billion shares owned by
employees and others.  Outstanding transferable shares amounted to 86.193 billion shares,
but consisted of only 34.11% of the total equity of listed corporations.  The transferable
shares included 60.803 billion A shares, 13.395 billion B Shares and 11.995 billion H
shares.
244  In 1999, the transferable shares increased slightly.  Among the 260 billion shares of
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accounted for 71.15% of the total equity of the listed corporations.  About 90% of the
nonnegotiable shares are State-owned shares and State-owned legal persons' shares.
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Table 1
Share Structure of Listed Corporations
246
As of 12/31/98
• No. of Shares (100MM)
Nontransferable Shares
•Sponsor Shares
•••••••Owned by Government
•••••••Owned by Domestic Legal Persons
•••••••Owned by Foreign Legal Persons
•••••••Owned by Others
•Shares Placed to Legal Persons
•Shares Owned by Employees
•Others
Sub Total
1,429.33
865.51
528.06
35.77
0.00
152.34
51.70
31.47
1,664.84
Tradable Shares
•A Shares
•B Shares
•H Shares
•Others
Sub Total
608.03
133.95
119.95
0.00
861.93
Total 2,526.77
The non-transferability of State shares is proving detrimental to the growth of Chinese
securities market and devalues the State's shareholdings.  Given that only one third of the
total shares of the listed corporations are tradable, State shares should be freely tradable.  This
should not only benefit the State shareholder, but also fundamentally stabilize the excessively
speculative stock market in China.  In 1999, as a first bold step, the Ministry of Finance
permitted the State-owned shares to be reduced to 51%.
247 This is a welcome step.
IV.  Conclusion
The first Chinese Corporation Law was enacted in January, 1904 during the late Qing
Dynasty.  When the new China was founded in 1949, business corporations gradually
disappeared.  This was due to importation of the highly centralized economy model from
former Soviet Union.  In the late 1970s, China started to introduce a market economy, SOEs
were redefined as business corporations, and private corporations were incorporated.   
Among other things, the traditional Chinese SOE governance system was one of theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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major built-in institutional obstacles hindering profit-maximization at enterprise levels.  In
the period of the planned economy, SOEs were treated as a branch of government, and
enterprise governance was nothing more than a part of the general system of government.
The purpose of SOEs was thus to fulfill the production plans of the government agencies, not
profit-maximization.  SOE managers became accountable to government agencies rather than
the market.  The SOE leaders were in essence like government officials in terms of their
responsibility toward their supervising government agencies, their official ranking and their
promotion.
The traditional enterprise governance regime is not compatible with the market economy
China is in the midst of developing.  For instance, most traditional SOE leaders are likely to
be loyal to their supervising government agencies and lack the expertise and experience
needed to operate the SOE business in a competitive environment.  The transition from the
planned economy to a market economy requires reformation of the composition and function
of SOE governance.
Chinese policy and lawmakers have been struggling in their efforts to determine the
optimal corporate governance model for Chinese SOEs.  At first, Chinese SOEs were granted
more autonomous powers, and SOE leaders were given more authority to manage SOEs with
a view toward profit maximization.  These legislative objectives are reflected in the SOE Law
of 1988
248 and implementing regulations of 1992.
249 However, with the general manager as
the paramount leader without any meaningful checks and balances from other interest groups
within the SOE governance structure, it is not surprising that these leaders began to misuse
their power.  Compared with the traditional governance structure of SOEs in the period of the
planned economy, the transitional governance structure of SOEs was even worse.  The
transitional SOE leaders had more managerial powers than their predecessors in traditional
SOEs, as well as more resources, thus facilitating embezzlement and misuse.  Moreover, thisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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period also included unnecessary and excessive government interventions.  In addition,
governmental agencies did not understand that their role as a shareholder of a business
corporation was different than their role as a governmental agency.  There was also no
predictable or feasible institutional norms established to govern the relationship among
governmental agencies, SOE leaders and other constituencies such as employees.  In short,
the transitional governance structure represented a creative yet unsuccessful effort to
restructure the SOE governance regime.
In addition to frequently reported managerial corruption, the SOE governance regime
was also marked by unsatisfactory financial performance.  As indicated in a report of the
China Enterprise Evaluation Association, the efficiency of China's top 500 industrial
enterprises was much lower than the top 500 global companies.
250  The average ratio of
profits to assets of the Chinese enterprises was 2.78%, compared to 11.29% for global
companies in 1988.
251  The per capita income for Chinese enterprises was US$27,456 while
their global counterparts enjoyed per capita income of US$288,855 during the same period.
252
In another example, the average total assets and sales revenues of China's top 500 industrial
enterprises in 1998 was US$711.6 million and US$398.1 million respectively, accounting for
a mere .88% and 1.74% of the top 500 global companies.
253  Although there are other factors
contributing to this poor financial performance of SOEs, unsuccessful SOE governance
played a substantially negative role.
In light of the shortcomings with both its traditional and transitional governance
structures, China has begun to look to the successful corporate governance role models in
market economies and has thus begun implementing some common corporate governance
norms (including general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and board of
supervisors).  In his government working report before the NPC on March 5, 2000, Premier
Zhu Rongji promised that the "Chinese government will actively encourage multinationalWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 407
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corporations to participate [in] the restructuring and transformation of SOEs.”
254
Multinational corporations will be able to acquire State shares in the future.  More liberalized
policies are expected to attract foreign investors to enter the Chinese securities market after
China enters the WTO.
Corporatization reform will not, however, be successful without sound corporate
governance.  It is necessary for Chinese policy makers to consider the corporate governance
structure as the core of the corporate system, and clarify the duties of the various corporate
actors such as the shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the
executives.
255  It is hoped that by eliminating excessive governmental control, ensuring the
government's interest as an investor, and effectively holding the management accountable,
Chinese SOEs will become more successful and attractive to foreign investment.
Good corporate governance in China, however, will not result from merely changes in
the Corporate or Securities Laws.  Good corporate governance will also depend heavily upon
successful reform of government agencies and the legal system.
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suitable modern enterprises for SOE restructuring are modern corporations, especially publicly held
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36 Decision on SOEs Reform, 15th CPC Central Committee (Sept. 22, 1999).
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Guidelines on Memorandums of Associations in Listed Corporations” of Dec. 16, 1997.  The former deals with
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(1993).  For provisions concerning the board of directors, see §§45-49, 51, 68, 112-18 Corporate Law (1993).
Provisions with respect to the board of supervisors can be found at §§52-54 Corporate Law (1993).
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Corporate Law §§50, 69, 119 (1993).  However, because the Chair is a member of board of directors, and the
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Chair in case the Chair is unable to perform his duty.  See §114, Corporate Law (1993).  In practice, the
secretary of the board of directors of listed corporations is also an indispensable corporate position.  However,
the board secretary is not recognized by the Corporate Law or the Securities Law.  Instead, this function is
required only by administrative regulations.
46 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) (1965); Fort & Schipani, supra note 2, at 852; Bradley et al.,
supra note 2, at 52-53.   See also, e.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate
Governance:  A Glimpse At German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819 (June 1996) (explores the
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German corporate governance); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Governance?  Two Steps on the
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Joaquin F. Matias, From Work-Units to Corporations:  The Role of Chinese Corporate Governance in a
Transitional Market Economy, 12 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (Winter 1999) (explores the tension between Chinese
corporations and the government within the context of corporate governance); Oliver Seiler & Bernd Singhof,
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corporations).
47  Chinese Corporate Law, §§ 38(2),(3), 103(2),(3) (1993).
48  German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), §111 (1965); Fort & Schipani, supra note 2, at 852; Bradley
et al., supra note 2, at 52-53.  See also Andre, Jr., supra note 46; Butler, supra note 46; Charny, supra note 46;
Gordon, supra note 46; Matias, supra note 46.
49 Corporate Law §2 (1993).
50 The general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors, and the board of supervisors are mandatory for
both types of corporations.  In both types of corporations, the board of directors and the board of supervisors
function on an equal level, and are independent from each other.  In both types of corporations, the general
meeting of shareholders, as the supreme authority of the corporation, has indisputable power to hold the two
boards accountable.  The wording used in the Corporate Law with respect to the duties of the general meeting of
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51 Corporate Law §51, 52 (1993).
52 Corporate Law §41 (1993).
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55 Corporate Law §66 (1993).
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instance, under the SOEs Law of 1988, an SOE is defined as “a socialist commodity production and operation
unit which, shall make its own managerial decisions, take full responsibility for its profits and losses and
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Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of
SOEs, adopted at the 4th Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee on September 22, 1999 (Decision on
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Yang Jingyu Explains the Corporate Law Amendments, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 18, 1999, at E.
59 Quanguo Renmin Dabiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai Gongsifa De Jueding (The Decision
on Amending Corporate Law by the Standing Committee of the NPC) (1999).  See PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 18,
1999, at E.
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is responsible to the NPC.
62 This Law was enacted by the NPC on April 12,1986.
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non-commercial SOEs, only 170 SOEs are under the direct supervision of the central government.  See Che
Haigang & Bo Jingwei, Corporate Governance in SOEs Should not be too Exceptional, ZHONGGUO  JINGJI
SHIBAO (CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES), Jan. 21, 2000, at 2.
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